一九二〇年代における鉄道の時間革命 by TAKEMURA Tamio
<Part ?THE DRIVE TO BE ON TIME: The
Contribution of Railroads>The Time Revolution
of the Railways in the 1920s: The Impact of
the Changeover to Automatic Couplers
著者 TAKEMURA  Tamio
journal or
publication title
Nichibunken Japan review : Journal of the
In ernational Research Center for Japanese
Studies / SPECIAL ISSUE : The Birth of
Tardiness: The Formation of Time Conscionsness
in Modern Japan
volume 14
page range 39-62
year 2002-01-01
その他の言語のタイ
トル
一九二〇年代における鉄道の時間革命
URL http://doi.org/10.15055/00000263
The Time Revolution of the Railways in the
1920s: The Impact of the Changeover to
Automatic Couplers
TAKEMURA Tamio
1  THE ROAD TO ON-SCHEDULE OPERATION
It is not only railway enthusiasts who think immediately of “time management to the
minute according to a fixed schedule” when talking about Japanese railroads. From the
Nozomi, which as a matter of course runs jauntily down the New To¯kaido¯ Line at hyper
speeds, to the Sonic, the JR Kyushu 883 Type limited express train, Japanese railroads
maintain on-schedule train operation. Nearly everyone recognizes that the railroads in
England, the country that pioneered railroads for the rest of the world, and in other
European countries are not up to Japanese standards of  time management. It can be said
that with respect to on-schedule train operation, Japan surpasses its mentor country,
England. But there is an important historical fact we should note here: on-schedule oper-
ation of Japanese railroads was not realized instantaneously in 1872, with the opening of
rail service between Shinbashi and Yokohama. Time management to the minute accord-
ing to a fixed schedule is an issue that has come up repeatedly during the long history of
Japanese railroads.
On the inability of Japanese railroads to maintain on-schedule operation during their
formative period, I yield to the authority of Nihon tetsudo¯gyo¯ no keisei: 1869-1894
(Nihon Keizai Hyo¯ronsha, 1998) by Nakamura Naofumi ????. Nakamura describes
how on-schedule time operation was not achieved, despite Tetsudo¯ryo¯ (The Japanese
Government Railway) Train Transportation Rules, and he explains the problems. We need
not recapitulate his research here. Rather, let us inquire when and in what circumstances
Japanese railroads realized time management to the minute according to a fixed schedule.
I will take a typical historian’s approach, presenting documents written about railroads
and seeking to discover clues to the problems. Let us first look at O¯wada Tateki’s “Train
Trip” (“Kisha ryoko¯”)1, written in 1895:
“A few days after the opening, on 5 April,” O¯wada wrote, referring to the Fourth
Domestic Industry Encouragement Exhibition in Kyoto, “I finally left Shinbashi by train
at 11:45 a.m.” He reported that he got off at Hamamatsu Station and stayed in
Hamamatsu, waiting for the down train that was to depart there at 6:00 the following
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morning. “I waited and waited, but the train didn’t come. This was the train that left
Shinbashi at 9:55 the night before. Though I had thought that there would be fewer
people taking a night train, it was said that there were actually more people getting on
the train at each station. I endured the wait, but the crowds were even greater than the
day before.” In the end, the train “arrived two hours late because of the extreme confu-
sion caused by the huge load of passengers who boarded the train along the way.”
O¯wada describes vividly, in a manner typical of a man of letters, a train that arrived at
its destination station in Kyoto two hours late. The point to which I want to draw atten-
tion is that at that time it was customary for wealthy passengers traveling from Tokyo to
Kansai to get off on the way in order to avoid night trains and to stay one night around
Hamamatsu. Incidentally, these delays that O¯wada encountered occurred at the most
crowded time for railroads, the beginning of the exhibition season. Therefore, we proba-
bly should not draw conclusions about the disarray of the train timetable based on this
document. Next, let us look at some examples of train travel on the first day of the new
year, when there were the fewest long distance travellers:
January first of Meiji 32 (1899) has at last come. . . . Thinking of getting on the up
train at 5:10, I came to Tsuyama Station after 4:00. There were many people,
Japanese and foreigners, in the switchyard. Farmers from nearby came and killed
some time, as trains are a novelty. Five o’clock came, but the train failed to arrive. At
6:00 it still hadn’t come. I asked the clerks, and others, but they didn’t know either.
The loiterers were all gone and the busy ones were all asking for their fares back, so it
was a crowded scene. . . . I had a rest and a little drink in a seedy inn, and finally at
10:15 the train managed to depart. I asked why such a delay had occurred and they
said it was because the train from Okayama, which had been supposed to arrive in
Tsuyama at 4:00, had halted operation due to damage to the locomotive at
Tamakasu, and that the company had three locomotives and thirty coaches, so there
had not been enough cars at Tsuyama on that day to allow an unscheduled train to
depart, and furthermore, they had not found out about it in time, etc. I heard that
the No. 4 locomotive, which had again been damaged at that time, went out of
operation the other day.2
The passage above is an example of train delays during travel between Tsuyama and
Osaka. Railroads at the end of the nineteenth century were objects of admiration for
farmers, who thought them high-class and were enchanted to an extent unimaginable
now. In that Japan of bygone days, the railroads were a force for conveying culture and
information to remote regions. This passage causes me to reflect deeply again on how
distant the Meiji era is from us today. The delays of trains mentioned above are examples
from branch lines. What about the most important trunk line, the express trains of the
To¯kaido¯ Main Line, the section from Shinbashi to Kobe that opened on 1 July 1889? I
offer two examples of express train delays in 1905 and 1907 from Tetsudo¯ jiho¯:
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When the Kobe express train, which left Shinbashi at 6:00 p.m. on the 12th past,
arrived at Kokufutsu Station at 7:50 on the same evening, it was discovered that the
rear wheel of the bogie brake van that was connected was extremely hot, and so they
immediately made quick repairs. We left there twenty-three minutes late. However,
these cooling repairs were again performed at each station on the way, such as at
Horinouchi, and at Hamamatsu as well, and gradually the train became delayed.
The train arrived at Nagoya Station at 5:00 the next morning—that is, it was
delayed about an hour-and-a-half. They said the up train had also been somewhat
affected by an accident.3
On the way from Kyoto, I boarded the express train for Himeji departing at 4:50. . .
This train runs to Osaka nonstop. This time, however, as the preceding train unfor-
tunately arrived at the station very late and left very late, the train on which I was
riding finally caught up with it. And as the train ahead of us was not an express, it
stopped at every station, and thus the express train I on which was riding, which was
not supposed to stop, had no recourse but to stop. Not only that, but what was real-
ly awful was that the train did things that might have been seen on Japanese rail-
roads almost ten years ago, such as stopping not at the station, but in the middle of a
field, whenever there was some trace of another train ahead.4
The To¯kaido¯ Main Line at the beginning of the twentieth century was a single track.
As the two examples just cited reveal, that must have been a major reason for train
delays. Thus even express trains were often delayed. (The double tracking of all sections
of the To¯kaido¯ Main Line was completed in 1913; 1926 for the San’yo¯ Main Line). I
should add that, although I’ve spotlighted the problem of train delays, the most impor-
tant key to on-schedule operation was prevention of early departures. In Tetsudo¯ryo¯ Train
Transportation Rules, No. 46, mentioned earlier, the early departure of trains was clearly
prohibited:
The primary duty of station workers is to be mindful of arrivals, switching and
departures of trains. . . . Never depart earlier than the scheduled time inscribed on
the timetables.5
For railroads, strict observance of operations manuals is always the core of time man-
agement. The realization of early departure prevention, expressly provided for in the
operations manual, was critical to the establishment of service discipline. However,
though the manuals lay out the standards set by the railroad authorities, they are at great
variance from actual train operation. Let us observe this point in Tetsudo¯ jiho¯:
Three minutes of delay in the departure from Shinjuku Station were recovered
between O¯kubo and Nakano; however, at the time of arrival at Nakano Station,
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since the place where the train stopped was incorrect and the last six cars were off the
platform, it was judged very dangerous for the passengers to get off. . . . We departed
from Ogikubo Station on time. However, neither at this station nor at other stations
was the custom observed upon departure of seeing trains off with careful observa-
tion. At Kichijo¯ji Station this careful observation seemed to be performed but we can
only judge that allowing the train to depart a minute early was improper (however, I
had a watch that I had synchronized with the news at noon on that day and had
nevertheless checked with the watch of the conductor at the rear section of the train
concerned, for confirmation—and my watch was one minute behind his—so the
above-mentioned minute early departure is based on a calculation based on the
watch of the conductor). . . . At Sakai Station the train again left one minute early.
At Kokubunji Station it departed two minutes early, and at Tachikawa, Hino and
Toyota Stations it departed about three minutes early, arriving at Hachio¯ji more than
three minutes early.6
From the above, it is clear that there were many actions seen one after another in
breach of Transportation Rules. For example, platform personnel omitted the acts of
standing at attention, watching carefully, and seeing off that should have all been per-
formed as a matter of course by the stationmasters of each station when trains were
received and sent off, and neither station staff nor conductors showed any concern about
the early departure of trains. The writer sternly warns about this point, saying:
A stationmaster’s standing and watching closely at the time of train arrivals and
departures is equivalent to bowing to demonstrate mutual concern when welcoming
and seeing off individuals, and if he neglects to do so he should not be exempted
from being called rude. Moreover, the final observation by the stationmaster when a
train starts out gives him the chance to discover such things as coupler (side chain)
defects or neglected car door latching, and can often prevent dangers that might lie
ahead. . . . Concerning the early departure of trains, there are express provisions in
Article 25 of Transportation Rules. The rules state that trains must never depart
before the time indicated on the displayed timetables. Keeping time is one of the
three biggest requirements, along with public safety and convenience; moreover,
these other two requirements are often related to the question of whether or not the
schedule is followed. Therefore, when time is lost, whether it be by delay or early
departure, it causes damage as a matter of course. To be sure, in actuality we cannot
compel cessation of delays in the operation of trains simply with prohibition orders.
However, with regard to early departure, we ought to be able to prohibit and extir-
pate it. If it is not prohibited, it will sometimes cause people who come to the sta-
tion on time, according to the schedule, to miss their opportunity to board trains
(an opportunity that fits into the category of public rights). This is why this provi-
sion exists.7
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To repeat, time management to the minute according to a fixed schedule was the
objective of the railroad authorities. However, concerning the most important thing,
actual train operation, it seems that in Japan discipline had been fairly lax since the days
of railroad founding. Of course we cannot generalize on the basis of the examples of the
Ko¯bu Line Railroad On-site Operation Section alone, but as we have seen, on-schedule
operation was an extremely difficult problem regardless of whether the country was
advanced or developing.
Another perspective on the problem of on-schedule train operation is to be found in
literary works. As is well known, among the authors in Japan’s modern era, Natsume
So¯seki demonstrated a particularly keen interest in railroads:
Nothing so much as the train represents twentieth-century civilization. It puts hun-
dreds of people into a box and zooms past. It is relentless. . . . Nothing despises indi-
viduality so much as the train. Civilization adopts every possible means to develop
individual character and then tries to stomp on this individual character by every
means possible. . . . Every time I see a train running fiercely and indiscriminately,
regarding all people as equivalent to freight, I compare the individuals impounded in
the passenger coaches to the train, running without paying even the slightest heed to
the individual characters of the people, and I feel it is dangerous, dangerous. The
odor of this danger thoroughly permeates modern civilization. The train, moving
blindly forward as if seeing in total darkness, is one specimen of this danger.8
This is from Kusamakura, in which So¯seki describes in detail, with a fine interpreta-
tion of the train as a tool of civilization, the loss of individual character in the informa-
tion space of the modern era. His novella Sanshiro¯, serialized in the Asahi Shinbun from
1 September to 29 December 1908, opens with a description of a scene inside a train. A
train that Sanshiro¯ boards at Shimonoseki Station on his way to Tokyo runs up the
San’yo¯ and To¯kaido¯ Lines with a final destination of Nagoya Station. Sato¯ Kiichi ???
? recently observed that this was a fictional train not listed in the Travel Guide of that
time.9 However, even though it was not an actual train, it is interesting that So¯seki paid
attention to its delays, which were quite ordinary for that time, and wrote that the train
arrived forty minutes late at its final destination of Nagoya Station.
Sanshiro¯ stays one night in Nagoya and then the next morning again boards the train
to go from Nagoya to Shinbashi. According to a study of old documents by Sato¯, this
train can be supposed to have been a local train, the No.24, departing O¯gaki Station at
6:30.10 According to the timetable, this No. 24 would have arrived at Hamamatsu Station
at 11:08, and then have departed at 11:14. “At Hamamatsu Station, the two of us
[Sanshiro¯ and Mr. Hirota] ate box lunches as if we had arranged it that way. Even after
we finished eating, the train still was not ready to depart.”11
Almost no readers of novels would have been interested in train delays. Nevertheless,
I wonder if So¯seki wasn’t trying to create an effect by putting a little verisimilitude into
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his novel. As seen in the passage above, he also described the train having difficulty leav-
ing Hamamatsu station. The keen sensitivity of So¯seki to the relation between railroads
and time can be also seen in the place where he makes Sanshiro¯ relate that “only the big
clocks caught my eyes”12 inside Nagoya Station. Such a sense of time as So¯seki’s did not
merely reflect the activity of his wonderful sensitivity. It seems probable that when So¯seki
was studying in England, he must have often visited railroad station buildings and seen
the big clocks decorating them, and such experiences might also have inspired the
description of the big clock at Nagoya Station used in Sanshiro¯.
2  INNOVATION IN THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT RAILWAY AND
ITS EFFECTS
The railroads in Japan at the beginning of the twentieth century could not maintain
on-schedule train operation; on-schedule operation, however, was realized in the 1930s.
Why was there such a change in Japanese railroads? To state my conclusion first, the
answer lies in railroad innovation during the period from enactment of the Railroads
Nationalization Law of 1906 until the 1920s. In order to consider this subject in detail,
let us scrutinize the actual situation of time management to the minute in railroads of
the 1930s by looking at several documents.
It can be said that train delays almost do not occur any more these days, not only
because of what people do but also because of the use of capital in various ways.
There used to be, until quite recently, trains that were often delayed because of yield-
ing to the Fuji super express train, but now this kind of thing has completely disap-
peared. . . . However, the disappearance of delays is not only for passenger trains, but
also for freight trains, as there is a separate line for freight trains only to the point of
Hiratsuka, and farther to the west there are no separate lines, so one cannot count
out freight trains. . . . This is the era of speed. At present the only service for passen-
gers is speed. As for electric trains, these run on the more than twenty-three miles of
the Yamanote circle line in exactly one hour, a reduction of six minutes from before.
However, for all the workers, this six minutes is not just a mere six minutes. As every
one or two seconds spent stopping at the stations counts, with about thirty stations
on the line it is not so easy.13
Thus Ito¯ Zensaku, the Stationmaster of Shinagawa Station in Tokyo, explains on-sched-
ule operation and time management to the minute on the Japanese Government Railway
in 1930. Ito¯ uses the expression “the era of speed” here, and reflecting the rationalization
of lifestyles, the 1930s was indeed a time of accelerating velocity. In the speed category,
not only trains, but also automobiles and airplanes introduced remarkable innovations in
traffic and transportation. Speed became the only standard for passenger service. The
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Japanese lifestyle was changed by this to an extent that rules out comparison with the
past. In the new “speed era,” the electric trains of the Japanese Government Railway
could run the more than twenty-three miles of one circuit of the Yamanote line—encir-
cling central Tokyo—in an hour, cutting six minutes off the time that had previously
been needed. To make this six-minute reduction, it had become a situation in which
“every second counts” for all who worked on the line. No other example better symbol-
izes the fixation of time management to the minute and second.  
An important task in age of acceleration was the linkage of speed to safety. For this
purpose, the engineer in the locomotive had to “keep watching the timetable together
with an absolutely correct clock hung at the front of the engine-bed.” On-schedule oper-
ation required a thorough mastery of skills; moreover “the proper way to accelerate dif-
fered depending on such weather conditions as windstorms, heavy rainfall or snow-
storms.” And since speedometers were not yet furnished in those days, except in a very
few locomotives, it was required “to observe the speed while staying inside the engine-
bed, quite a practice.”14
As evident from the two examples above, there was a qualitative break in railroad
operations between the beginning of the twentieth century and the 1930s. This was a
decisive change in the railroad operation system in Japan. The first thing we have to ana-
lyze is how such innovation in the railroad operation system progressed from the
Railroad Nationalization Law of 1906 until the 1920s. The integration of railroad trans-
portation was a requirement of Japanese capitalism on its road to development, but the
military, from its experience in the Russo-Japanese War, also recognized the nationaliza-
tion of the railways as a pressing problem: 
In Germany, there is the example of railroad fees for export cargo being reduced to
the level of actual expenses. As for the railroads in our country, in order to solidify
the foundation for nationalization, there is a need to adjust the fee rates based on the
policy of hastening the independence of the railroad economy. However, from the
point of view of the national economy, the main duty of the railroads, which occupy
the forefront among means of transportation, should be to encourage exports by
lessening transportation fees, especially for export goods, and to animate domestic
industry. (Report of the Special Survey Committee.). . . . People in both commerce
and industry are saying that the insufficiency of the means of transportation is disad-
vantageous and inconvenient, while fees are not inexpensive, compared to foreign
countries. Although there are no complaints about the freight transportation capacity of
the railroads in normal situations, once the economic sector demonstrates a little vigor
and the circulation of freight increases, suddenly we start hearing of freight hold-ups,
something we think is extremely regrettable. (From a report by Wada Toyoharu, Hibiya
Heizaemon, and Hamaguchi Kichiemon; emphasis added by the author.)
A document submitted in 1909 to Katsura Taro¯ in his capacity as minister of finance
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in his own second cabinet explains the requirements for railroads after nationalization as
seen by the business world.15 Looking at freight fee rates, as did the writers of the docu-
ment just quoted, business interests asked for decrease and unification. In combination
with nationalization, their argument was effective, and the first, transitory reforms were
implemented in October 1906. It is worth noting that the long-distance incremental
decrease method was also put into effect for the freight transportation fees through this
reform. Adoption of unified fee rates nationwide was realized with their reduction in
October 1912. The regional expansion of the domestic market was facilitated solely by
the reduction in the fee rates and the system of incrementally decreasing fee rates as
freight distances increased. This became possible for the first time through nationaliza-
tion itself.16 Through nationalization, the increase of freight transportation capacity men-
tioned above clearly described a trend. That is, improvement in train allocations and
operations reduced the time of freight holding and transportation, and this caused a
reduction in the distribution time for the products.17
Additionally, after nationalization, the operation of long-distance trains increased
gradually in terms of passenger transportation as well. However, as of April 1907, even
on the To¯kaido¯ Line, which, due to its large volume of traffic, was legitimately called the
“trunk line” among the previously government-established lines, there were, as direct
trains between Shinbashi and Kobe, only three express and two local trains. The time
required for the above section was thirteen hours and twenty minutes for express trains
(fastest) and nineteen hours for local trains. I will illustrate the actual situation of trains
running on the To¯kaido¯ Line during this period by drawing from Tetsudo¯ jiho¯:
When I looked inside the train, thinking of boarding, it was completely full.
Everywhere people were boarding to overflowing. There was no standing room,
either. . . . The train had a capacity of about 350 persons and consisted of four third-
class bogie coaches that were supposed to be for 100 persons, a restaurant car in the
middle, brake vans at front and rear and a freight car at the rear for postage and
small luggage and hand luggage. . . . For the dining car, a coach that had been previ-
ously divided between second-class and dining, with some repairs, was used and
equipped with chairs and long benches for twenty-four persons, with leather cush-
ions placed on all of the seats. . . . One thing I would like to mention here is that,
compared to the extremely cramped conditions of the coaches, the dining car was
like heaven, and thus there were many passengers occupying it, using eating and
drinking as excuses. For example, by merely buying a small bottle of beer, or a cake
or some fruit they would spend one or two hours—and in the worst cases some
would just bring in box lunches and occupy the seats.18
Imanishi Rinzaburo¯, a director of the Hanshin Railway, recorded these impressions
after taking a test ride on the third-class express train (departing Shinbashi at 7:30 a.m.)
that had been newly established on 16 April 1906. As can be glimpsed in his descriptions
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of this test ride, in those days the concentration of passengers on the To¯kaido¯ Line was
high, especially for passengers on the express trains. First- and second-class express trains
bound for Kobe, which departed Shinbashi Station one hour earlier than the above-men-
tioned third-class express trains, also became full as their speed won them popularity.19
The sense of time of people in those days was quite loose; most led easygoing lives.
However, as the value of express trains for long distance train travel became recognized,
the number of travelers with rational notions regarding the relation between speed and
train fees increased. Tetsudo¯ jiho¯, in an article titled “Separation of Ordinary Trains and
Special Trains Must Be Specified,” relates:
There are four direct trains to Kobe on the To¯kaido¯ Line. The two trains departing
Shinbashi at 6:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. are both express trains and arrive in Kobe in
about fifteen hours. The two trains departing at 12:30 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. are both
local direct trains and do not arrive in Kobe until nineteen-and-a-half hours later. . .
In addition, a dining car is attached for the express train, and coaches with fine and
beautiful decorations and other equipment are used, that is, new and improved
coaches. However, for the local trains they use quite old coaches, and there is no din-
er. As for other means of providing comfort to the passengers, whereas for express
trains everyone from top to bottom seems to be fearful of shortcomings in such
things as the selection of train boys and care of the station staff, this is not so for
local trains. . . . The difference between ordinary and special is already very clear, but
the fees from passengers for both trains are exactly the same. How unfair and
absurd.20
These passages were written in July 1905, just before nationalization. Speed as the
criterion of superiority was certainly on the way to becoming one of the ideas that
defined the era. In fact, on 16 April 1906, just after the proclamation of the Railroad
Nationalization Law, it was decided for the first time to set the types of trains operating
on the To¯kaido¯ Line as special express, express, and local. Thus it came to pass that
express fees were established for passengers on special expresses, and express tickets sold.
In 1912, the Imperial Japanese Government Railway started the operation between
Shinbashi and Shimonoseki of first and second-class limited express trains with dome
cars attached, and employing train managers. The passengers on these trains needed lim-
ited express tickets and seat tickets with seat numbers inscribed.
The Japanese Government Railway completed nationalization and greeted the 1910s.
In this period, with World War I as a turning point, transportation volume increased
dramatically together with the remarkable development of the Japanese economy. The
transportation capacity of the Japanese Government Railway reached its limit and pas-
senger transportation became hard-pressed, with freight backlogs continuing to increase
rapidly. For example, the To¯kaido¯ Line, on which double tracking of all lines and a rein-
forcement of transportation capacity had been completed in 1913, came very close to
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paralysis due to the epochal increase in transportation demand created by World War I.
An article in the Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun of 13 April 1918, “Massive Congestion in
Chock-full Trains and Railroads Amazing,” attacks the railroad authorities for “conges-
tion encompassing all railroad lines reaching maximum levels after the beginning of
April, with examples of exceeding fixed capacity and missed trains being too numerous
to enumerate.” The writer continues, “In particular, the crowding is even more severe
and also the nuisance to passengers is even greater on the To¯kaido¯ Line. . . . What kind
of countermeasures will the Railroad Agency adopt for this situation?” 
In answer to such criticism, the authorities had no recourse but to resort to such
statements as, “Since we have increased the number of cars as far as locomotive tractive
force permits, we have no further capacity.” The solution of chock-full trains was a mat-
ter of course for the Japanese Government Railway of those days, but an even more
urgent task was the “speedy disposition of freight backlogs as a busy autumn for the busi-
ness world approaches.”
The transportation capacity of the railroad was limited and the reinforcement of its
facilities was not likely to happen in a brief span of time. Therefore, from the end of
1916 the increase in freight backlogs became even more severe, and in the autumn of
1917 it ratcheted up yet another degree, and to top this, at the beginning of the next
year, it reached the ultimate limit of transportation capacity. This crisis, as I shall explain,
led to the realization of on-schedule train operation. Ishida Taro¯, who filled successively
the posts of Operation Section Chief, Sendai Railway Office Chief, and Kobe Railway
Office Chief and had a thorough grasp of the situation in those days, states:
With the progress of the change of the times, trains increased, new lines were estab-
lished and single tracks were expanded into double tracks. Accordingly, the number
of newly hired people increased, and a keen awareness arose of the necessity of their
instruction and training. In addition to the training of chief locomotive engineers,
locomotive crew manuals were created and distributed to ordinary people inside the
sections, helping them to teach themselves and making it easy for recently hired peo-
ple to learn and master the techniques and business routines. A little while later, a
training school for engineers and boilermen was established. Thus, from around
1915 or 1916, trains throughout the jurisdiction began to operate on time. Later on
this became customary and the bad reputation with the public of trains being gener-
ally delayed was thoroughly purged.21
Thus was born the on-schedule train operation of which the Japanese Government
Railway could be proud before the world. Concerning the realization of on-schedule
operation of trains, O¯shima Fujitaro¯ points out, “It was born under conditions in which,
to meet the demand for transportation that increased abnormally around the time of
World War I, the additional investment of funds was small. Compared to the increases in
passengers and freight, increases in cars and equipment, which naturally should have
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been made, were insufficient. . . . Such ‘excellent’ results were not attained by the adop-
tion of new machinery and equipment, but through the accumulation of skilled ability
in each individual Japanese Government Railway worker, and were the product of extra-
ordinary intensification of labor.”22 I heartily endorse Prof. O¯shima’s remarks. However,
it goes without saying that the continuing accumulation of ability of “individual skilled”
workers is not sustainable. Plainly speaking, maintaining on-schedule train operations as
“the product of extraordinary intensification of labor” was not the only basic factor
directly supporting the above-mentioned time management to the minute according to a
fixed schedule by the Japanese Government Railway in the 1930s.
Then how should we comprehend the relation between maintaining on-schedule
train operations in the 1910s, which was “the product of extraordinary intensification of
labor,” and the maintaining of time management to the minute and second in the
1930s? In order to resolve this point, I want to analyze the issue of innovation, which
progressed remarkably by means of full-scale capital investment into the Japanese
Government Railway in the 1920s. This innovation took several forms: domestication of
the production of large-type locomotives and electric locomotives with powerful trac-
tion, improvements in the slope of rails on trunk lines (note the opening of the Tanna
Tunnel on 19 June 1933), mounting of automatic couplers on all cars, adoption of
pneumatic brakes on all cars, expansion of electrified lines, and other changes. The
1920s was a period in which the mindset was converted. In response to the crisis of the
crush of passengers and freight transportation on the Japanese Government Railway, the
focus shifted from supplementing the shortfall of investment of funds with “extraordi-
nary intensification of labor” to innovation that made capital investment its lever. Due to
the influence of party politics on government at that time, innovation did not progress in
a linear fashion. Railroad construction for political motives and factional infighting
became overt, and traps were laid to cause setbacks to the renovationist factions, typified
by the issue of broad gauge track construction.
Next, let us consider the political issues surrounding the Japanese Government
Railway. First, what about the Kenseikai party? Having had, since its foundation, a
strongly urban tinge representing the strata of business and industry persons, the
Kenseikai advocated taking measures for fundamentally reconsidering such things as
transportation equipment and cars, supporting innovations, and reinforcing transporta-
tion capacity. And what about the Seiyu¯kai party? The Seiyu¯kai party had a strong base
in farming villages and depended on landlords and merchants, stressing the construction
of new lines in rural areas over giving importance to smooth transportation of the labor
force and products. Against such a political background, focussing attention on the two
positions in the discussion of broad gauge track reconstruction (reconstruction of narrow
gauge rails of about 110 cm to broad gauge of about 145.5 cm) among the policies of
the Japanese Government Railway, Prof. O¯shima states:
Among the supporters of broad gauge were Goto¯ Shinpei (president of the Railroad
The Time Revolution of the Railways in the 1920s 49
Agency), Nakamura Korekimi (president of the Railroad Agency), Sengoku Ko¯ichi
(railroad minister), Shiraishi Naoharu (professor at Tokyo Imperial University),
Furukawa Hanjiro¯ (vice president of the Railroad Agency), Shima Yasujiro¯ (technical
manager of the Japanese Government Railway), Kinoshita Toshio (business office
chief of the Japanese Government Railway) O¯sawa Kaio (transportation department
manager at staff headquarters), Ishimaru Shigemi (vice president of the Railroad
Agency), O¯mura Sho¯taro¯ (Japanese Government Railway construction office chief ),
and others. . . . In 1918, with the rice riots as a stimulus, the Terauchi Cabinet col-
lapsed and the Hara Takashi Cabinet of the Seiyu¯kai party, called the first “party cab-
inet” in Japan, was inaugurated. As a result, the presidency of the Railroad Agency
switched from Nakamura Korekimi to Tokotsugi Takejiro¯. In the Diet of the next
year, 1919, a halt of broad gauge reconstruction was announced, and all too easily
was lost that one chance in a million to change the narrow gauge rails, which made
our Japanese Government Railway rest on a “colonial-type” foundation, to broad
gauge.23
It must already be clear why the Hara Cabinet scuttled the measures for the upgrad-
ing of trunk line transportation by reconstruction with broad gauge. Concerning the sit-
uation in which the broad gauge supporter group was all swept away by the fixation with
self-serving political measures, O¯kura Kinmochi, the Freight Section Chief at that time,
says:
The first task Mr. Ishimaru [Ishimaru Shigemi, vice president of the Railroad
Agency] performed was to sweep away the people from the Kinoshita group. And I,
too, was chased out to be Transportation Section Chief of the Western Parts of the
Railway Office after I had been in my previous position for only seven months. . . . I
am certain that the politicizing of the railroads began in the Ishimaru era, and this is
extremely regrettable.24
Even though the group of leading bureaucrats in the Japanese Government Railway
that was connected to the lineage of the broad gauge reconstruction argument was
defeated, the innovation in the Japanese Government Railway that they had promoted
since around the beginning of the 1910s became a stimulus for the breakthrough in the
crisis of passenger and freight transportation. Additionally, this contributed to the speed-
ing up that reduced the time required between the capital city of Tokyo and other cities.
These cities communicated with each other through the medium of multidirectional
economic activities, development of transportation and traffic, communications technol-
ogy, and the like, and formed the foundation of open and vigorous modern urban struc-
tures. 
Automatic couplers were of great significance. Among the innovations that advanced
remarkably from the 1910s to 1920s, the mounting of automatic couplers was a measure
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of the improvement of railroads that could not be realized even in England, the pioneer
country of railways. In the United States, where railroads were built much later than in
Europe, automatic couplers were adopted from quite an early stage, but railroads in the
advanced countries of Europe, epitomized by England, used screw couplings, and so did
Japan. Countries on the European continent had narrow areas of land bordering others,
and each had a different railroad situation. Moreover, there were international direct
trains, and in this circumstance, it was not possible for just one country to mount auto-
matic couplers. However, the fact that England was still using old-fashioned type cou-
plers, even though, as an island country like Japan, it did not have to deal with trains
running across borders, shows how difficult a task it was to change them all at once. As
will be shown later, very high risk was associated with screw couplings in connecting
operations, and every country shared the common anguish over the many deaths and
injurious accidents to brakemen. The International Labor Conference in Geneva,
Switzerland, adopted in October 1923 a resolution on the safety issue to arouse the
attention of each country:
Believing that the issue concerning automatic couplers to be important to the safety
of railroad workers, and in order to decide whether or not an international agree-
ment on this matter is desirable, the Fifth International Labor Conference has
requested the Labor Administration to obtain information from the governments of
each country and from international technological and industrial organizations.25
In those days, the adoption of automatic couplers was an issue for European railroads
as well, but their mounting had not exactly been planned on any particular schedule at
all. Japan, however, tackled this subject squarely, as we will see below. In response to the
above resolution of the International Labor Conference, a report titled “The Automatic
Coupler Issue in the Japanese Government Railway” was submitted in November 1924
through the Social Office of the Interior Ministry. This report drew international atten-
tion. Thus, the operation of mounting automatic couplers that was carried out by our
country was a unique pioneering innovation in the world. It also deserves special men-
tion that overall operational efficiency was epochally increased by the application of time
and motion studies, regarded as extremely important among scientific management
methods. In the next section, this subject will be considered by focusing on the problem
of mounting automatic couplers on all cars. 
3  TIME AND MOTION STUDY AND ESTABLISHMENT OF 
THE ON-SCHEDULE SYSTEM
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Japan was using screw couplings in rail-
roads in Honshu, Kyushu, and Shikoku—everywhere except Hokkaido (where every-
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thing was integrated with automatic couplers in and after 1909). The screw coupler was
composed of a loop and threaded rod mounted at one end of a car, and a chain coupling
device—made up of three chains—mounted at the other end of the car. In order to cou-
ple the cars, a loop of the screw coupler at one end of car A must be looped over a hook
of one end of car B and held there by a threaded rod in the center, then a loop from the
chain coupler of car B has to be looped over the hook of car A. The chief difficulty of
this coupling operation is that the brakeman has to enter into the narrow space between
cars and pick up the screw coupler, which weighs as much as about twenty kilograms,
and loop it over the hook on the other car. Coupling operations at that time not only
required proficiency but were also extremely dangerous. If the brakeman made a mistake,
he could lose his life by being smashed between cars. Out of the number of deaths and
injuries to brakemen engaged in switching operations (in Honshu) in 1922, as many as
167 of the 355 of these occurred during decoupling and coupling operations. Out of the
number of deaths or injuries to brakemen doing switching operations (in Hokkaido) in
that same year, four of the thirteen of these occurred during decoupling and coupling
operations.26 Because these dangerous coupling and decoupling operations took quite a
bit of time, they were huge obstacles to train speeds and to freight train operating effi-
ciency.
Since the foundation of the Japanese Government Railway, one of the biggest events
concerning the mounting of automatic couplers must have been the integration of auto-
matic couplers in the cars of Hokkaido in 1909 by Shima Yasujiro¯, the Chief of the
Machine Section. Screw couplings were used at that time for cars in the rest of Japan,
and although there were some improvements, the adoption of automatic couplers was
only occasionally an issue, and one that had never been realized. The winning essay in a
contest conducted by Tetsudo¯ jiho¯ in August 1905 shows such a tendency inside the rail-
road:
To the question of how much it costs to change the Type A (screw couplings) to the
Type B (automatic couplers), referring to the expenses for the change on the
Hokkaido public lines, the average price for two Type B couplers (with accessories)
was about 90 yen, and about 70 yen more was required to mount the new equip-
ment after the remodeling of Car A, so altogether for one car a remodeling fee of
160 yen was required. Then supposing that the number of cars, excluding Hokkaido
and Taiwan, is 26,000 (the total of locomotives and cars), the total cost would be no
less than in the neighborhood of 4,160,000 yen. No matter how good the idea may
be, it is impossible to hold the expense for 26,000 cars to a small amount. . . .
Although this problem has been regarded as very important in our country, too,
there has not been any special invention other than the two types, and if a new type
could be invented, if it were just a little better than the present ones, we would not
be able to invest the amount of money for the above-stated remodeling. So the best
route must be to make improvements based on Types A and B. . . . Therefore, I con-
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clude that the perfect train coupler for application in our country is the latest
“Janny” style automatic coupler (the latest one, the type used in the United States,
light and appropriate for the cars in our country) used by the Hokkaido Line
Operations Office for Taiwan, Hokkaido and nearby islands. For Honshu, Kyushu,
Shikoku and nearby islands, the latest screw coupling in use by the Operations
Office should be used.27
As pointed out in this 1905 prizewinning essay, industry experts had considered
adoption of automatic couplers on the grounds that it was necessary to integrate couplers
after the nationalization of the railroads, but there was a great deal of opposition because
of the huge costs and other things that would have been required. It was not until after
1918 that consciousness of the adoption of automatic couplers started to arise inside the
Japanese Government Railway. In 1918, Shima Yasujiro¯, the chief manager of the
Machine Office, was sent to the United States as an envoy of the railroad by order of
Goto¯ Shinpei, the president. As the conclusions of his inspection, Shima summarized
measures for the Japanese Government Railway in three points: first, to adopt automatic
couplers and to make the operation of long trains possible as well as to attempt to ensure
the safety of the brakemen; second, to adopt pneumatic brakes—using continuous
brakes for freight trains also—and to attempt the safe operation of long trains; third, to
encourage the construction of sidings to manufacturing factories and warehouses, and
the like, to lessen short transits. The president at that time, Goto¯’s successor Nakamura
Korekimi, adopted Shima’s suggestions, and they were approved in a resolution of the
Railroad Agency during budget preparations for fiscal year 1919. Then, in 1923, a
research committee concerning implementation of automatic coupler mounting was
formed in the Railroad Ministry (which was established in May 1920). 
On 16 July 1925, the Japanese Government Railway carried out in a single day the
simultaneous nationwide adoption of automatic couplers. The changeover affected 3,205
locomotives, 8,544 passenger cars and 51,552 freight cars.28 As the Asahi newspaper of
18 July reported, “The record times for the mounting of single cars at Tokyo Station
were four minutes for a locomotive, sixteen minutes for a passenger car, and thirteen
minutes for a freight car.” This meant that Japan had actually succeeded in overtaking its
mentor country, England, in railway technology, and it was enough to make railroad
experts around the world marvel. In addition to the presence of numerous newspaper
writers and 254 members of the Mechanical Engineers Society for this mounting opera-
tion of automatic couplers, inspection tours were made by groups of railroad engineers
from China and England and engineers from the Alliance Automatic Coupler
Manufactory in the United States. It was noted in the Asahi Shinbun of 17 July 1925
that “railroad workers came all the way” from China and India to inspect this “world-
class operation.”
The automatic coupler had numerous functions that made it superior to the screw
coupling. With the old type coupler, both spiral and chain couplers were mounted at the
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front and rear of cars. With the automatic coupler, only one kind of coupler was mount-
ed at the front and rear of cars. No manpower was required for coupling operations and
it could be done automatically. Moreover, as the front and rear units were the same type
of equipment, the direction of cars could be changed without it becoming necessary to
change any equipment. To separate cars, it was sufficient just to pull a lever lightly from
the outside of the cars, so coupling operations were speeded up in safety, and as a result
fatal accidents or injuries were almost eliminated. The tractive force possible with auto-
matic couplers was several times greater than with the old-fashioned ones, and the length
of the couplers was shortened by about thirty-six centimeters. Thus, due to such capabil-
ities, it became possible to increase the numbers of cars connected to trains. In response
to the crunch of passengers and freight transportation in the World War I period, the
Japanese Government Railway made efforts to reinforce the tractive force of locomotives.
In order to strengthen the tractive force of a locomotive itself, it was necessary to enlarge
the firebox for coal consumption. For this purpose, the Japanese Government Railway
combined small drive wheels and enlarged boilers and manufactured locomotives for the
exclusive use of Type 9600 freight trains, an epochal narrow gauge train. As a result, the
average number of freight cars coupled to one train increased 45%—from 28.1 cars in
1916 to 40.8 cars in 1921.29 Domestic large-type locomotives and large-type electric
locomotives, which appeared one after another in the 1920s, not only remarkably
increased this coupling capacity, but also succeeded in speeding things up through hav-
ing automatic couplers mounted. The construction of the Tanna Tunnel, the mounting
of automatic couplers, the rationalization of manufacturing of large-type locomotives
and large-type electric locomotives and the adoption of pneumatic brakes for all cars
symbolize innovation in the Japanese Government Railway in the 1920s.
The epoch-making automatic coupler mounting project, a project to surpass the rail-
road technology of Europe, was suggested and performed by the technicians group of the
Japanese Government Railway led by Shima. These were outstanding technicians who
had been brought together from several previously private railroads on the occasion of
nationalization. In the sense that they attempted the nationwide integration of railroad
technology and its development, they can be called pioneers who were attuned to the lat-
est technological currents. They systemized the railroad factories nationwide and led the
installation of automatic couplers, splendidly scoring brilliant successes as general project
managers. The highly advanced aspect of this group was that they had the technological
sense to regard time and motion studies as important during preparatory operations.
Full attention must be paid to the fact that time and motion studies in the Japanese
Government Railway began under the influence of U.S. industrial management.
Japanese engineers at the time had read about time and motion study in the United
States, which was the most advanced in the world, but until they went to study in
America they had little knowledge about the actual situation of the business manage-
ment movement, which had progressed remarkably in connection with the management
of factories since the end of the nineteenth century. Here, I must note the example of
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Frederick Winslow Taylor (1856-1915), who became the chief engineer of the Midvale
Steel Company in Philadelphia in 1882 and established the foundations of scientific fac-
tory management methods. He conceived what he called the “Duty of the Manager”
based on his duties inside the company, and summarized it thus:
1. Allow science to develop each element of human operations and thereby halt the
old-fashioned reliance on guesswork.
2. In place of the previous way in which the workers themselves decided the amount
of work or refined their skills, select the most superior operators for each specific
operation, perform educational training, and endeavor to have them make progress.
3.  Seek harmonious cooperation between managers and workers to promote the
execution of activities based on the principles of advanced science.
4. In place of the previous way in which the majority of major responsibilities were
imposed on the workers, allocate the duties equally between managers and workers
so that each can be in charge of the area most appropriate for each.30
One of the major aims of the Taylor system of scientific management was to promote
“harmonious cooperation between managers and workers” as elucidated above. Taylor
said that the “Duty of the Manager” was to make the transition from the “previous way
in which the majority of major responsibilities were imposed on the workers” to scientif-
ic management. It was natural for the criticism of labor unions to be directed at the
Taylor system for this reason. However, during World War I, the recognition of human
factors in productivity was deepened for both labor and capital. After World War I, the
American Federation of Labor (AFL, founded in 1886) became friendlier towards scien-
tific management because of the experience during the war. We know that in labor
unions, criticism was beginning to arise of the many entrepreneurs who were attempting
to improve industrial efficiency by traditional means.
The circumstances described here have shown that if the Japanese Government
Railway tried to renovate itself, the effort would have to be connected with the direction
of new business management. Around 1912, Yamashita Okiie, a technician of the
Japanese Government Railway, made a business trip to the United States and there for
the first time recognized that car repair technology associated with time and motion
studies had made striking advances. Regarding this, Yamashita stated:
Operation research was so-called “motion study” and I had seen it in books, and had
thought it could be implemented for mass production or precision industry, but
when I went to America, it was actively being done in the repair shops there. . . .
Locomotive repairs were being done there in about a week to nine days. And freight
cars were being repaired in just one day. In Japan in those days, work was taking
forty to fifty days for locomotives and fifteen days for freight cars.31
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Yamashita’s observations show clearly that in relation to the development of the rational-
ization of business management in the twentieth century, it was a period when the tech-
nician group of the Japanese Government Railway was forced to tackle the time study
problem squarely. Not just a matter of locomotive or freight car repairs, the situation
developed so that what was required was a concept behind the construction of the tech-
nology system of the Japanese Government Railway that corresponded to the tidal cur-
rents of international business management.
It is true that the level of enlightenment of Yamashita, who learned from American
time and motion studies, surpassed what he had acquired domestically, and it affected
the entire Japanese Government Railway. The era had come when the support and con-
cern of technicians and workers nationwide effected the establishment of time and
motion studies. Years later, Yamashita Okiie recalled this:
I asked Mr. Noda and Mr. Kato¯ [author’s note: Noda Nobuo and Kato¯ Takeo of
Mitsubishi] and had them give many lectures, then selected people from railroad fac-
tories all over the country, training many to be specialists. That is why the railroads
broke the ice in Japan for the beginning of large-scale motion studies. We later
decided to call the motion studies that I have just mentioned “operation research.” 32
The basic concept of “operation research” of the Japanese Government Railway by
central technicians such as Yamashita Okiie was to educate systematically the people
selected from factories all over the country, to make them the elite of operation research,
and to attempt to improve the technology environment in factories from the bottom up.
Rather than technicians conducting research individually, they created a research system
and performed operation research on the whole Japanese Government Railway.33
Therefore, it was natural that the Japanese Government Railway played the leading role
among the nation’s industries in the deployment of time and motion studies. Let us now
investigate the pedigree of industrial efficiency research in Japan. Hoshino Yukinori ??
?? translated the writings of Taylor and published them under the title Gakuriteki jigyo¯
kanri ho¯ in 1911. The next year, in 1912, Scientific Management was published as an
unscheduled issue of Jitsugyo¯kai, with Iseki Ju¯jiro ????? as editor-in-chief.
Outside the country, efficiency lectures hosted by the Manchurian Railway (lecturer,
Ueno Yo¯ichi) were held in Dairen in 1926. The “Manchurian” efficiency research group
originated in the next year, 1927. However, in Japan in the early years of the twentieth
century, time studies and motion studies did not spread beyond the areas of research and
informational activities. The very few examples of actual exercise of scientific business
management principles included the operation research by Ueno Yo¯ichi at the Lion
toothpaste factory in 1920, the enforcement of scientific management methods at
Nakayama Taiyo¯do¯ and Fukusuke Tabi K.K. in 1921, also by Ueno, and the commence-
ment of efficiency research by the Mint Office in 1923.34 As has already become clear, in
establishing a pedigree for research and application of time and motion studies in Japan,
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the Government Railway was far ahead of the herd.
Our glance at the relation between time and motion studies and the mounting of
automatic couplers has diverted us into the problem of the pedigree of scientific manage-
ment in Japan. Returning now to the main subject, let us confirm how operational effi-
ciency was raised by the adoption of time and motion studies at the preparatory stage for
the mounting of automatic couplers. Practice for the changing operation for automatic
couplers began around 1924 or 1925 in each factory under the Japanese Government
Railway. It was conducted especially in each factory and locomotive inspection place, in
order to “determine the most appropriate operation method and establish it as the stan-
dard, and to train the ordinary workers”:
From early on in this operation, time and motion studies were performed, and we
conducted scientific research on how to eliminate idle or racing states, and how to
lessen fatigue in the case of consecutive operations; we investigated the number of
persons for one group, the share in the operations of each person, the equipment to
hold and the order of operations. . . . We conducted practice in each factory in a
competitive style…to give proper impetus to the competitive spirit, because what is
most effective in increasing efficiency at work is for each person to have excitement
in the heart. . . . We attempted to make thoroughly clear to everyone that the
responsibility of factory workers in the automatic coupler mounting operations was
significant, because what is most effective in increasing efficiency is everyone recog-
nizing his own responsibility and exerting himself voluntarily.35
Through the use of time and motion studies, the level of skill in the changing opera-
tions was rapidly improved. In each factory there were many technicians who, by learn-
ing the scientific management method, came to understand well the importance of man-
power. Various contrivances concerning research on the equipment to be used, how to
create competitions for skill acquisition, the idea of responsibility for labor and the like
were developed out of the dialogue between thuse technicians and the workers. The best
ideas and know-how among these were immediately standardized and transmitted to fac-
tories all over the country. Such efforts by railroad workers can be seen, for example,  in
the following report about preparative practice for locomotive shed workers:
Fundamentally employees in the shed do not have hourly wages corresponding to
those of Class 3 employees in factories, and unless there is an atmosphere in which
employees hone their skills of their own volition, it will be difficult to perform suffi-
cient preparations…. Not only have we considered ways of creating manpower by
rationalizing the density of personnel allocations and thereby reorganizing again and
again the turns of staff members in the shed, but we have also attempted to improve
the actual performance of drills in work skills by attempting increases in net labor
hours by such things as extending working hours or abolishing official holidays. The
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fact that nobody has ever complained about this and everybody has given service is
worthy of special mention.36
Practice drills for mounting of automatic couplers intensified from around December
1923 in locomotive sheds and inspection buildings nationwide. A competition was con-
ducted pitting factories against each other on a regional basis, and an extremely high lev-
el of ferocity was reached. During the period of practice for automatic coupler installa-
tion, the Japanese Government Railway attempted an across-the-board imposition of
time and motion studies in factories, locomotive sheds and inspection places.
Additionally, in order for all workers to understand the operational details upon training
in each office, they studied how the operations should be conducted and performed sim-
ple technology training.37 As a result, an exact analysis of the time required for the effi-
cient execution of the operations and operational methods were established, and the pre-
vious operational style that depended on the instincts of workers and traditional customs
was radically uprooted. This innovation resulted in “great performance on the day of the
overall change.”38
As we have seen, time and motion studies gradually penetrated into the working style
and psychology of workers, and their consent to scientific management was obtained.
On 6 July 1925, the section chief of the personnel affairs section sent instructions to the
head of each railroad office, titled “Matters Concerning Special Bonus Payments for
Persons Involved in the Changing of Couplers.” These instructions explained that the
scope of rewards was to include Junior Officials and those below them, and that one
share of allocation was to be at most 20 yen per person.39 Advocates of the rationalization
of the Japanese Government Railway succeeded in drawing total cooperation from the
workers on the big project of changing the automatic couplers by affirming Taylorism
and bringing the workers into its framework. That is, even though the workers were
pushed into the all-out control of labor and personality as a result, they cooperated vol-
untarily.
The organization where workers preserved their rights from the extraordinary intensi-
fication of labor was the labor union. How did the labor union, in the form of the
Operation Committee Support Association, established in September 1924 (reorganized
as the All Japan Railway Employees Union in 1926),40 fight against Taylorism? This
union was too weak in the organizational and conceptual aspects, in any event, for the
workers gathering in the newly born union to announce their disapproval of the intro-
duction of Taylorism, or to manage their labor voluntarily according to their intention
and benefit as a group. What did it mean that the workers in the Japanese Government
Railway could not defend themselves against the fierce onslaught of rationalization? In a
word, it meant that the innovation of the Japanese Government Railway, which
reformed the traditional labor style, was accompanied by such problems as authoritarian-
ism, the intensification of labor, psychological tension and low wages.
On the other hand, the big project of mounting automatic couplers was a success
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that could be vaunted before the world. As such it caused the importance of tightening
up time to be recognized throughout the Japanese Government Railway system, and dis-
solved the old character of railroads which since the middle of nineteenth century had
supported the loose sense of time. As a result, in the 1930s the Japanese Government
Railway succeeded in on-schedule operation in which every minute and second counted.
In this sense, the success of the automatic coupler mounting project was a symbol of the
time revolution in the Japanese Government Railway in the 1920s.
1. Connecting the screw coupler. 2. Connecting the chain coupler. 
3. Coming out after connecting. 4. The connection is completed. 
Demonstration of the operation of the screw coupling (Museum Meiji-Mura)
(photo by Hashimoto Takehiko)
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